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Abstract: 
With rising petroleum costs and a plethora of other influences causing international 
ethanol demand to grow at an unprecedented rate, discussion of trade liberalization has become 
an important point of debate for the ethanol production industry. Although there have been many 
studies on the results of the removal of trade barriers there has been little emphasis on the 
potential impact it would have on domestic industrial organization. This paper looks to analyze 
the possible effects of ethanol trade barrier removal between Brazil and the United States on U.S. 
industrial organization through evaluation of the removal's ,influence on incentives for 
consolidation in both fanner and non-fanner owned sectors of the U.S. ethanol production 
industry. Both the existing deadweight loss due to the accumulation of trade barrier costs and the 
potential for costs associated with increased market concentration are compared in the evaluation 
prooess as well as evaluation and incorporation of theory on trade flows and market structure 
resulting from trade tariff removal. 
I. Introduction 
It is uncertain whether or not when Henry Ford described ethanol as "the fuel of the 
future l " he had such a distant future in mind. For nearly a century, oil has dominated transport 
fuel markets as the primary automotive energy source. However, metaphorically speaking, the 
stars have aligned for the ethanol production industry. Predictions that world oil reserves are 
approaching exhaustion combined with increasing concern over rising international crude oil 
prices, greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, energy independence, and other important 
factors have caused an unprecedented boom in global ethanol production and trade. With such 
rapid increases in the international trade of ethanol, hastily constructed trade agreements and 
domestic and international trade practices/policy are shaping the industrial structure of this still 
emerging global industry. It is estimated that tariffs onethanol trade between the United States 
and Brazil have already cost nearly 80 million dollars in social deadweight loss2. For this reason 
a rather large and influential group of political leaders and economists, headed by Jeb Bush the 
co-chairmen of the Interamerican Ethanol Commission, are advocating the removal of barriers 
currently designed to promote and protect domestic production3. This paper looks to analyze the 
possible effects of ethanol trade tariff removal between Brazil and the United States on U.S. 
industrial organization through evaluation of the resulting increase of incentives for 
IWilliam Lemos, "The Brazilian Model" JCIS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
 
http://www.icis.com/publications.
 
2Ariadna Martinex-Gonzalez, Ian M. Sheldon, and Stanley Thompson, "Estimating the Welfare Effects of U.S.
 
Distortions in the Ethanol Market Using a Partial Equilibrium Trade Model" Journal ofAgriculture and Food
 
Industrial Organization 5 (2007): 227-42.
 
3Interamerican Ethanol Commission, "Leadership" Interamerican Ethanol Commission,
 
http://heIpfue Ithe fu ture. org/weblcontent!viewl41/541
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consolidation in both fanner and non-farmer owned sectors of the U.S. ethanol production 
industry. 
II. Background 
In the timeline for automotive transportation, ethanol is even older than the Model T. It 
has been produced and consumed in the United States and Brazil throughout the past century. 
Ethanol was first used as a transport fuel in the U.S. around 1908 and its mass production 
continued into the late 1930's at which time a plant in Atchison, Kansas was producing nearly 18 
million gallons of ethanol per year for over two thousand service stations across the Midwestern 
United States4 . However, after Wodd War II petroleum based alternatives became available in 
mass and at low costs taking over the international markets for transport fuel. Interest in U.S. 
ethanol production did not resurface until 1978 when the tlrst tax exemptions were passed for 
gasoline blended with 10% ethanol5. 
Even during ethanol's global decline in the 1940's Brazil has been a significant outlier in 
the global trend away from ethanol and towards its petroleum based substitute, gasoline. In 
Brazil a 5% blending of anhydrous ethanol into the nation's gasoline was first approved in 1931 
and then made mandat~ry in 19386. Ethanol became recognized as more than just an additive in 
the early 1970' s when Brazilian spending on foreign crude oil quadrupled. With such an increase 
in spending ethanol began to be seen as a serious alternative to crude oil? Government officials 
4 William Lemos, "The Brazilian Model" lCJS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
 
http://www.icis.com/publications.
 
5 Joseph Dipardo. "Outlook for Biomass Ethanol Production and Demand:. Energy Information Administration.
 
(200 I): 1-14. <www.eia.doe.gov/oia£.analysispaperlbiomass.html>.
 
6 Masami Kojima and Todd Johnson. "Potential for Biofuels for Transportation in Developing Countries" World
 
Banke Energy and Water Department, http://www.esmap.org/filezipubs/31205BifuelsforWeb.pdf.
 
7William Lemos, "The Brazilian Model" lCJS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
 
http://www.icis.com/publications
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foresaw the need for better domestic availability of ethanol and by 1975 Brazil initiated 
Proalcool, a forceful program of incentives for domestic ethanol production. With the help of 
Proalcool subsidies, Brazilian ethanol production quickly rose from 158 million to approximately 
900 million gaUons per year in 1978. Ethanol production continued to grow when in 1979 
another oil crisis hit Brazil causing the price of crude oil to more than triple. As energy 
independence became an even more important goal for Brazil even car manufactures joined the 
ethanol revolution. By 198676% of Brazil's new cars were made with modified ethanol engines 
and domestic ethanol production reached 3.5 billion gallons8. This far surpassed U.S. production 
at this time which was still only 710 million gallons, making Brazil the pioneer of large scale 
ethanol production9. 
Brazil's ethanol production and consumption slipped in the late 1980's and early 1990's 
as the domestic subsidies provided by Proalcool were greatly reduced. This removal of subsidies 
triggered reduction in ethanol supply resulting in an ethanol shortage that shook consumer 
confidence. A reduction in ethanol consumption soon followed and by 1990 the proportion of 
new cars produced with ethanol engines dropped to 11 % 10. However, nearly a decade later the 
introduction of the flex fuel automobile, a vehicle with an engine capable of running on both 
ethanol and gasoline along with, once again, rising oil prices increased international interest in 
alternative energy sources causing Brazil's domestic ethanol production to resurge. By 2006 
Brazilian production rose to roughly 4.5 billion gaUons per year and is predicted to reach as high 
8W illiam Lemos, 'The Brazilian Model" lCIS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
 
http://www.icis.com/publications.
 
9Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
 
http://www.ethanolrfa.orglindustry/statistics/.
 
10 William Lemos, "The Brazilian Model" lCIS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
 
http://www.icis.com/publications.
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as 9 billion gallons per year by 2013 11 • However, even with a head start and historically high 
levels of domestic support for ethanol production, Brazil is currently only the second largest 
producer of ethanol in the world. 
The United States is the world's largest producer of ethanol and like Brazil is 
experiencing record expansion in the industry. U.S. ethanol production has increased 
dramatically in recent years. Currently, the U.S. produces roughly 7.2 billion gallons of ethanol 
per year with another 6.2 billion gallons of yearly production capacity under construction l2 . 
However, even though Brazil and the United States are industry leaders and unrivaled in their 
ethanol production abilities, thus far both countries still employ protectionist policies designed to 
shelter their domestic ethanol production industries. This protection is achieved by virtually 
prohibiting ethanol trade between the two countries with steep import tariffs 13. 
Discussion of ethanol trade between the U.S. and Brazil begins with its production process 
and use of feedstock, or the biomass from which the ethanol is produced. Much like the process 
used to make moonshine, the production of Ethanol is a microbial conversion of biomass or 
feedstock such as corn or sugarcane into alcohol 14. Although ethanol can be produced from 
sugars found in a variety of different plant biomasses, in Brazil and the United States it is 
produced almost exclusively from com or sugarcane. First, the biomass is converted into sugars, 
which are fermented. After this fermentation process water is removed from the product creating 
the substance known as anhydrous ethanol. In the final step anhydrous ethanol is denatured, a 
11Wiliiam Lemos, "The Brazilian Model" lCIS Chemical Business Americas 271 no. 5 (2007),
 
http://www.icis.com/publications.
 
12 Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
 
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/.
 
13 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New
 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 189-205.
 
14Moreira, Jose R. and Goldember, Jose. ''The Alcohol Program," Energy Policy (1999) 229-245
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blending process that makes ethanol unfit for human consumption by adding amounts of 
substances like gasoline l5 . 
Generally, producers of anhydrous ethanol do not blend their own ethanol, this is done by an 
industry of blenders or refiners separate from the initial production process. Because anhydrous 
ethanol produced from any feedstock is essentially the same product it is assumed to be 
homogenous or a non-differentiable good. This means that ethanol blenders can purchase 
anhydrous ethanol without regard for its source-biomass I6 . This study will focus only on 
Brazilian ethanol made from sugarcane and u.s. ethanol produced from com assuming the 
quantities of ethanol produced from other feedstock to be insignificant in relation to u.s. 
Brazilian trade and its effects on industrial organization. 
Ethanol produced from sugarcane is far less expensive to produce than ethanol produced 
from com. However, transportation costs limit sugarcane's use in the United States, a country 
that for the most part lacks the tropical climate and rainfall necessary for mass sugarcane 
production. Additionally, because all ethanol is part of a weight losing production process the 
most efficient structure for ethanol production will result in an industrial organization where 
ethanol production facilities are located in relatively close proximity to the areas where their 
specific feedstock is produced 17. For this reason the U.S. is limited to the production of com­
based ethanol and Brazil, having the ability to produce sugarcane, may use this feedstock as a 
more efficient source of ethanol production. Once the original feedstock is transformed into 
anhydrous ethanol, it is, as was mentioned, a homogenous product l8 . 
f5 Masami Kojima and Todd Johnson. "Potential for Biofuels for Transportation in Developing Countries" World 
Banke Energy and Water Department, http://www.esmap.org/filezipubs/31205BifuelsforWeb.pdf. 
16 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New 
York: McGraw-Hili, 2008), 197 
17Moreira, Jose R. and Goldember, Jose. "The Alcohol Program," Energy Policy (1999) 229-245 
18 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New 
York: McGraw-Hili, 2008), 189-205. 
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Both the United States and Brazil currently restrict the trade of both anhydrous and 
blended ethanol. Brazil protects its domestic production industry with a tax of roughly 30% on 
all imported ethanol. The United States imposes a 54 cents per gallon and 2.5% advalorum tax or 
tariffon all imported ethanol. The United States also offers a 51 cents per gallon production 
subsidy by way of tax credit to the ethanol blenders in order to account for the comparative 
advantage Brazilian producers of anhydrous ethanol obtain from the use of sugarcane as a more 
efficient feedstock. The tariffs, applied to both anhydrous and blended ethanol, effectively 
prevent ethanol trade between the U.S. and Brazil creating a situation in which both countries 
only produce ethanol for domestic consumption and for export to countries without significant 
import tariffs on ethanol 19. This closed structure can be viewed in Figure 1. 
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19 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 195. 
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Therefore, in presence of trade tariffs, ethanol trade between the u.s. and Brazil is 
virtually nonexistent. This is depicted in the simplified trade flow diagram of Figure 2. The 
exception to this prevention of exchange is a small exemption in international policy. Under 
provisions in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) member states are able to export ethanol made 
from at least 50% U.S. produced feedstock to the United States free from dutlo. Because of this 
policy, Jamaica is now the second largest importer of ethanol into the United States with other 
CBI countries following close behind21 . However, in reality this imported ethanol is not a 
product of Jamaica. Instead, the policy allows for the importation of Brazilian ethanol through 
countries like Jamaica. The amount imported is a rather small. In 2006 sixty million gallons, only 
about 7% of the United States' domestic production, entered the country duty free through CBI 
proVIsIOns22. 
20 Ariel Cohen, "Two Cheers for the President's Brazilian Ethanol Initiative" WebMemo by The Heritage 
Foundation no. 140 I (2007), http://www.heritage.orglresearch/energyandenvironement/wm140 I.cfm. 
21Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association, 
http://www.ethanolrfa.orglindustry/statistics/. 
22Ariel Cohen, "Two Cheers for the President's Brazilian Ethanol Initiative" WebMemo by The Heritage 
Foundation no. 140 I (2007), http://www.heritage.orglresearch/energyandenvironement/wm140 l.cfm. 
8 
Figure 2 
Under this relatively closed trade status of industry protection, growth in U.s. ethanol 
production has developed into an internally competitive domestic production industry. 
Approximately 140 firms of various sizes are producing anhydrous ethanol across the United 
States23 . The Federal Trade Commission or FTC, confirmed this internal competitiveness in its 
report on the market concentration of the U.S. ethanol production industry. Market 
Concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirsclunan Indices (HHI). This process looks to 
define whether or not a single firm or small group oftirms could wield sufficient market power 
23Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association, 
http://www.ethanolrfa.orglindustry/statistics/. 
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to set prices or coordinate on prices or output. This is an activity far from unheard of in the 
agricultural processing industry. The results fall into one of three categories: unconcentrated with 
an HHI score from 0 to 999, moderately concentrated with an HHI score from 1000 to 1799, or 
highly concentrated with an HHI Score of 1800 or above. The higher a market's HHI score, the 
more concentrated it is and the more likely it is that market prices are subject to a set price or 
coordinated influence. Using production capacity data provided by the Renewable Fuels 
Association or RFA, the FTC's 2006 report gave an HHI score ofjust over 500 to the ethanol 
production industry. The report therefore concluded the market to be unconcentrated. It also 
indicated that market concentration in the ethanol production industry, according to annual HHI 
scores, has been falling for nearly a decade24 . 
Reduced concentration is desirable in ethanol production as a more competitive, less 
concentrated market structure is generally viewed to be more socially beneficial due to the basic 
economic theory surrounding competition and market power of a commodity like ethanol25 . A 
competitive market requires many sellers, a rdatively homogenous product being sold, relatively 
small market shares held by each firm, a situation where no one seller views its market share as 
threatened by a competing seller, freely accessible information, and freedom of market entry and 
exit. With enough firms producing the same product and no one seller holding a sufficient share 
in the market to be able to influence buyers, then each firm will compete equally and the market 
price will settle at the point where the marginal cost to producers is equal to the marginal benefit 
or demand of consumers. Through the process of competition societal benefit is maximized with 
24FTC, "2006 Report on Ethanol Market Concentration" Federal Trade Commission (2006).27. 
25 Moreira, Jose R. and Goldember, Jose. "The Alcohol Program," Energy Policy (1999) 229-245 
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an appropriate price to quantity relationship in which, theoretically, the maximum number of 
consumers is supplied at the lowest price still covering the costs of production26 . 
This study assumes that ethanol sufficiently fits the criteria to merit a perfectly competitive 
market. Both anhydrous and blended ethanol are homogenous. As a traded commodity, ethanol 
industry information is publicly regulated and open, no significant barriers exist to market entry 
or exit in the ethanol production industry and currently the deconcentrated nature of the market 
shows that firms should not perceive a threat to their market share. Thus, the U.S. ethanol 
production industry seems to be adhering to economic theory and appropriate industrial 
organization by trending towards a less concentrated market structure27 . 
One misperception about the ethanol is that the United States' ethanol production industry is 
often perceived as a farm based enterprise. However, over halfofU.S. ethanol production 
capacity is current y non-farmer owned. The majority of non-farmer owned production is 
controlled by large, often multinational companies. The top two ethanol production companies 
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and POET control approximately 34% of all ethanol production 
and the top five production companies account for roughly 47% ofproduction28 . By analyzing 
the breakdown of farmer owned vs. non-farmer owned production capacity currently under 
construction, it can be seen that U.S. industrial organization is trending quickly towards a more 
non-farmer owned industrial structure29 . This is important to the overall market concentration of 
the United States' ethanol production industry as market deconcentration has traditionally 
occurred during a time when non-farmer or privately owned capacity decreased as a percentage 
26 David Hyman. Economics (Burr Ridge: Richard D. Irwin inc., 1994),352
 
27 ibid.
 
28 Harnza Hasan. "Overveiw of U.S. Ethanol Market." Food FirstlInst~tute for Food & Development Policy.
 
http://www.foodfirst.org/nodel1723.
 
29 Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
 
http://v.rww.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/.
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of total production. This indicates that, historically, the distinction between ownership type has 
been significant in analyzing market concentration 30. This correlation can be seen in Figure 3 
graphs constructed from FTC data along with data from the RFA. This shift towards a privately 
dominated industry is evident in the construction of new ethanol plants. Because the production 
industry looks to double in size within the next three years and a very large majority of the new 
construction is non-farmer owned the industry wi]! soon be dominated by private firms. 
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30 Susanne Schill. "Will Consolidation Follow Deconcentration?," Ethanol Producer Magazine Febuary. 2007. 4 
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The trend away from farmer owned cooperative plants is potentially important in analyzing 
the effects of trade barrier removal on the industrial organization of ethanol. Farmer owned 
capacity is often viewed as synonymous with cooperative production capacity as most of the 
farmer owned capacity constructed is organized in a cooperative structure. A farmer owned 
cooperative is comprised of individuals that have pooled their funds to construct a locally 
operated production facility. This allows a farmer to gain partial ownership in an ethanol 
production facility usually with an agreement that at least a specific amount of grain be sold to 
the facility each year. Farmers share in the dividends of the production facility as well as utilize 
the sale of ethanol as a means of hedging the risk of crop prices. This distribution of dividends 
and use of ethanol production as a means of hedging reinvests more of the revenue generated by 
ethanol production into the rural economy. Yet, it also provides less potential for reinvestment in 
capital expansion. Cooperatives also have limited access to other sources of capital, most 
notably venture capital. Since the main goal of a cooperative is to realize market gains and 
distribute the benefits of these gains amongst its members, it is limited in its ability to reinvese 1. 
Because ownership ultimately makes decisions on consolidation and expansion, this study will 
evaluate the probable effects of trade barrier removal between the U.S. and Brazilian ethanol 
production industries on both U.S. farmer and non-farmer owned production sectors. 
31 CFA "A Brief on a Canadian Cooperative Investment Plan" Canadian Federation ofAgriculture Publications 
(2007) 2. 
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III. Review of Literature 
Ethanol, as an international commodity and viable substitute for oil consumption, has 
only recently become a subject of intensive academic research. For this reason, the literature 
analyzing international ethanol markets is very new and the quantity available is limited. Yet, the 
studies that are available contain very pertinent and up to date analysis allowing new research in 
the field of ethanol trade tariffs and subsidization to be relatively cutting edge. 
In-depth analysis of trade tariffs and the price effects of trade liberalization is available in 
a 2007 article for the Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization's special issue on 
biofuels. This article analyzes reductions in the tariffs imposed on Brazilian imports of sugarcane 
ethanol to the United States and vice versa. Using a partial equilibrium trade model, the analysis 
predicts the effects of industry trade distortions on societal deadweight losses surrounding 
ethanol trade. Through this process the authors claim that static deadweight loss under current 
conditions is roughly $80.62 million and that cumulative losses by 2017 would be roughly 
$2,400 million32 . 
In Suani Coelho's report to the United Nations on advantages and trade barriers in the 
global biofuels markets, the argument is made that trade barriers are making the global 
development of ethanol problematic. The report shows that Brazil has a clear advantage over the 
United States in ethanol production with much lower costs. Coelho suggests a move toward trade 
liberalization. However, Coelho also admits that countries mandating ethanol use and providing 
32 Ariadna Martinex-Gonzalez, Ian M. Sheldon, and Stanley Thompson, "Estimating the Welfare Effects of U.S. 
Distortions in the Ethanol Market Using a Partial Equilibrium Trade Model" Journal ofAgriculture and Food 
Industrial Organization 5 (2007): 227-42. 
14 
incentives for domestic production serve to positively promote the learning curve ofbiofuels 
. 33pro uchon 
Paul Gallagher's 2006 study on international competitiveness of the U.S. corn ethanol 
industry as compared to Brazilian sugarcane ethanol production uses an econometric model to 
estimate U.S. produced ethanol's ability to compete. In the subsequent time series analysis of 
competitiveness in trade flows, Gallagher argues that both Brazilian and U.S. tariffs could be 
reduced for the benefit of both countries. Brazil, he argues, may have less incentive for such 
action because they are currently using the Caribbean Basin Agreement to re-export ethanol to 
the United States. However, Gallagher maintains that more so than Brazil, the U.S. may see 
incentives for the removal of trade barriers. Once barriers are removed Gallagher predicts 
relatively equal flows between the U.S. and Brazil based on random seasonal factors 34. 
David Sandalow's book "Freedom from Oil" provides a new and interesting perspective 
on the future of trade policy regarding ethanol. Sandalow argues that if the goal of the United 
States is energy independence its current trade restrictions are "utterly illogical." He maintains 
that if correctly phased out U.S. tariffs on ethanol importation could benefit the nation without 
any negative effect to farmers which he notes as a major concern of policy makers. Because 
current subsidies are given to blenders of ethanol which can process ethanol from any country 
just as easily, the tariff on ethanol imports is necessary to keep the U.S. from subsidizing 
international production. In the interest of free trade and societal gain, Sandalow suggests that 
the trade tariffs on ethanol imports be removed. He argues that in order to counteract this 
reduction in trade barriers, the 51 cent per gallon tax credit/subsidy given to blenders should be 
d . 
33 Suani Coelho, "Biofuels ~ Advantages and Trade Barriers" (Report presented at the United Nations conference
 
on Trade and Development, 1-28, 2005).
 
34 Paul Gallgher, "The International Competitiveness of the U.S. Com-Ethanol Industry: A Comparison with Sugar­

Ethanol Processing in Brazil" Agribusiness 22 (2006): 110-134.
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given instead directly to ethanol producers. This would keep u.s. ethanol policy from essentially 
subsidizing foreign production while keeping its ethanol competitively priced35 . 
Although there is sufficient argument and economic backing to make a case for removing 
trade barriers between the United States and Brazil there has been little done to predict the 
resulting effects on industrial organization due to this removal of trade barriers. This study will 
expand upon current trade liberalization arguments by attempting to produce significant theory 
on the effects of trade liberalization on trade flows, economies of scale, and the possibility of 
market concentration through increased incentives for consolidation. It is expected that the costs 
to trade liberalization will be outweighed by the potential costs of market consolidation negating 
the benefits of trade tariff removal. 
IV. Theory and Analysis 
According to the most recent literature, removal of trade tariffs would drastically alter 
trade flows between the United States and Brazil. Following Sandalow's suggestion that the 54 
cents per gallon and 2.5% advalorum taxes on imports should be lifted while the U.S. production 
subsidy for ethanol blenders is shifted to producers and assuming that Brazil would also lift its 
tariff on imported ethanol, bilateral trade of both anhydrous and blended ethanol would be 
possible between the U.S. and Brazil as is shown in Figure 4. However, unless the 51 cents per 
gallon subsidy to U.S. blenders is shifted to producers of anhydrous ethanol, the blenders who 
are able to purchase without regard to the feedstock used to produce anhydrous ethanol could 
pass the subsidy along to Brazilian producers effectively causing U.S. tax dollars to subsidize 
35 David Sanda1ow, Freedom From Oil: HolV the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008),189-205. 
16 
Brazilian ethanol production. If the subsidy is removed completely U.S. production of anhydrous 
ethanol would not be abk to compete with the cheaper more efficient ethanol production process 
used in Brazil because of the availability of sugarcane36 • 
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Because of seasonal variances in the price of feedstock, removal of tariffs on ethanol 
trade between the United States and Brazil will lead to relatively equal bilateral trade where 
neither Brazil nor the United States dominates. Instead the two countries will trade with each 
other rather equally. In these more open markets both anhydrous ethanol producers and blenders 
would be able to trade their homogenous products to consumer markets in the opposing 
36 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 189-205. 
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country37. Brazilian blenders would have the opportunity to purchase U.S. corn-based ethanol 
during times when factor prices make u.s. produced anhydrous ethanol cheaper. U.s. blenders 
would have exactly the same opportunity to purchase Brazilian anhydrous ethanol. Exchange of 
this nature means that trade flows would exist after trade barrier removal that were previously 
unavailable, changing the international market structure for both anhydrous and blended 
ethano138 . 
Because the price of subsidized u.s. com-based ethanol and Brazilian sugarcane-based 
ethanol are relatively equal in price, trade will occur in unpredictable seasonal patters39.This 
equal trade will occur as virtually unlimited factors including crop yield projections weather 
patters consumer confidence estimates and predicted political actions in both Brazil and the 
United States have the potential to cause price fluctuations making it less expensive to buy 
ethanol from Brazil one day and the United States the next40 . These open avenues for exchange 
would combine to create the increased trade flow patterns as is shown in Figure 5. 
37paul Gallgher, "The International Competitiveness of the U.S. Com-Ethanol Industry: A Comparison with Sugar­

Ethanol Processing in Brazil" Agribusiness 22 (2006): 110-134.
 
38 David Sandalow, Freedom From Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States' Oil Addictiion. (New
 
York: McGraw-Hili, 2008), 189-205.
 
39 Paul Gallgher, "The International Competitiveness of the U.S. Com-Ethanol Industry: A Comparison with Sugar­

Ethanol Processing in Brazil" Agribusiness 22 (2006): 110-134.
 
40 RP Campbell. Personal Interview. Archer Daniels Midland. Decatur, IL., 12 March 2008.
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Figure 5 
With such an increase in the velocity of trade between the United States and Brazil, it 
can be assumed that economies of scale will provide larger firms with the ability to lower their 
costs through more specialized and consolidated departments for management and marketing·, 
specifically international marketing abilities or the ability to sell effectively in complex 
international markets will become an advantage to ethanol production firms. Economies of scale 
occur when the long run average total cost curve declines with increases in output41 . In a tariff 
free ethanol market, specialized management and marketing teams would provide for more 
efficient, lower cost, sales in the now more complex and volatile transnational markets for 
• It is important to note that marketing as used in this paper refers to the buying and selling of the commodity 
ethanol and not the more informal definition referring to a firm's advertising abilities. 
41 Gregory Mankiw, Essentials ofEconomics (Thomson South-Western, 2004),180-185 
19 
ethanol. Specialization in marketing including multinational presence would give large 
internationally established companies an advantage in ethanol marketing through their ability to 
more accurately act on market infonnation. For example, when visiting the ADM international 
headquarters one will notice that all commodity marketers are in one large open room filled with 
employees specializing in currency and commodity exchange for specific locations around the 
world. Hundreds of workers can easily communicate with one another, exchanging important 
infonnation about price changes or potential price influences in related markets. The ethanol 
marketers for ADM are just steps away from hundreds of individuals specializing in different 
markets and different global regions, making their marketing decisions more infonned and 
logically more efficient than a small finn with just one or two marketers to make decisions about 
the sale of the ethanol their company produces42 . This is an advantage of specialization and more 
efficient transnational marketing ability is seen by larger finns and increases with the more open 
international trading. In order to establish efficient scale or the point at which average total cost 
is minimized smaller firms would see incentives to achieve the marketing advantages held by 
larger producers. 
In order to achieve these newly available economies of scale finns have two basic 
options. The first option is to expand their production capacities through increasing the size of an 
existing plant or constructing a new plant. With the use of basic supply and demand analysis it 
can be seen that increasing a finn's capacity through construction would increase ethanol supply 
and drive down the price of ethanol making it an undesirable avenue for achieving economies of 
scale. The second option, consolidation, would achieve scale economies without increasing total 
ethanol supply. With supply remaining the same, the market price would remain unchanged. 
42 RP Campbell. Personal Interview. Archer Daniels Midland. Decatur, IL., 12 March 2008. 
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Therefore, acting in their own self interests finns would logically choose to expand through 
consolidation43 . One barrier to consolidation is that finns would not want to acquire production 
facilities which are not technologically up to date as they would then gain in production size but 
loose in efficiency due to increases in the costs of production for a less advanced plant. However, 
this is a relative non-issue in the ethanol production industry as the vast majority of production 
facilities have been constructed in the past five years and can therefore be assumed to be up to 
date technologically44. 
Once it is established that consolidation will occur, how it will occur must then be 
implied separately for both fanner owned and privately owned production as this distinction has 
shown significant influence on market concentration in the past. Despite their unique structure 
and the dual nature of the benefits received by a fanner owned production facility, economies of 
scale would still exist for cooperatives and, baring the existence of some values-based objection, 
cooperatives would act in their own self interest and seek out a new efficient scale4s . However, 
as was mentioned earlier the cooperative structure of ownership leaves a fanner owned finn with 
limited capital for investment. This disadvantage makes most cooperatives unlikely acquisitors in 
the consolidation process46 . One option for cooperatives to retain their ownership structure and 
achieve economies of scale would be to fonn conglomerated cooperatives and combine the 
management and marketing from their previously separate production facilities. Without the 
available capital for the acquisition, the other option for cooperatives would be to sell out to a 
larger privately owned finn likely to have the capital necessary for the purchase. However, with 
43 Gregory Mankiw, Essentials ofEconomics (Thomson South-Western, 2004), 180-185 
44 Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
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45 Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association,
 
http://www.ethanolrfa.orglindustrylstatistics/.
 
46 CFA "A Brief on a Canadian Cooperative Investment Plan" Canadian Federation ofAgriculture Publications
 
(2007) 2. 
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the most recent boom in production farmer owned cooperative capacity continues to decline as a 
percent of total capacity. As a result its intluence on overall market concentration is also 
declining making the issue of private consolidation more important to overall market 
concentration. 
The path to consolidation for the privately owned firm is more straight-forward. These 
production companies do not see external benefits due to increases in the price of corn and other 
grains nor the benefits of rural development due to the fact that they are mostly controlled by 
absentee owners. Because many private firms have the available capital to invest in the 
acquisition of capacity through consolidation the option for private firms to achieve economies 
of scale is to buy up existing production capacity or be bought out. The only other option would 
be some sort ofhybrid private-cooperative where economies of scale were achieved through a 
more complex mutual agreement between a cooperative and private tirm. Therefore, although 
consolidation would likely occur in various ways depending on plant ownership, it will still 
likely occur in both the farmer and non farmer owned sectors of the U.S. ethanol industry and 
lead to a more concentrated industry overall once trade tariffs are removed47 . 
Increased consolidation is important to the evaluation of industrial organization as it leads to 
the possibility of price fixing or monopoly pricing. This process is far from unheard of in the 
agricultural processing industry as U.S. based ADM and a group ofother international firms 
were convicted ofjust such an act in 1993. In a more concentrated market the possibility of 
monopoly pricing or monopoly power becomes available. For the purposes of this research, 
concepts ofmonopoly pricing will be used to explain the dangers of market concentration as the 
47 Moreira, Jose R. and Goldember, Jose. "The Alcohol Program," Energy Policy (1999) 229-245 
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similarities in the theory behind monopoly and oligopoly pricing and their relationships to the 
subject of ethanol production make differentiation unnecessary48. 
Monopoly pricing in ethanol production would occur when one firm or group of firms gains 
a large enough share in the market to effectively influence the market price for ethanol. 
Production firms face incentives to produce at quantities below the socially efficient levels and 
charge prices higher than the marginal cost of production for ethanol. As profits are the price 
received by the producer for a unit of ethanol less the cost to produce that unit, then a firm will 
receive additional profits by reducing quantity or by influencing prices above the marginal cost 
of production thereby capitalizing on consumers' willingness to pay. lncentives for such 
behavior can be reahzed until the point where revenue of an additional unit of ethanol production 
equals the cost of that additional unit of production. Beyond such a point the cost of foregone 
ethanol production/supply would exceed the benefits of an increase in price/profits received by 
the ethanol producers49. 
Although producers of ethanol could improve profits under monopoly price techniques, it 
resu]ts in a net social loss. In a system of monopoly pricing, consumers who would have 
purchased competitively priced ethanol can no longer atTord to do so, resulting in a deadweight 
loss. Any upward influence on prices or reduction in quantity from the competitive equilibrium 
will result in a reduction in total surplus or deadweight loss. This loss of societal net benefits is 
displayed by the shaded gray area in Figure 6. The area represents units that remain unsold at 
points where demand or willingness to pay exceeds marginal cost or supply. Simply stated, in the 
48 Gregory Mankiw, Essentials o/Economics (Thomson South-Western, 2004),180-185 
49 Gregory Mankiw, Essentials 0/Economics (Thomson South-Western, 2004), 186 
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presence of monopoly/oligopoly pricing, fewer consumers realize the benefits of ethanol 
consumption than would be able to in a competitive market5o• 
Figure 6 
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Since there is the opportunity for trade between the United States and Brazil, making 
them part of one international market, any oligopoly pricing techniques would have to also 
include Brazil's dominant producers. Although sufficient data is not currently available for the 
Brazilian ethanol industry to definitively say weather or not Brazil would increase its market 
concentration. For the purposes of this study and because there is no available information that 
would greatly conflict the assumption, it will be assumed that Brazil's production facilities 
would react to incentives tor market consolidation similar to U.S. producers and therefore share 
the same risks of monopoly/oligopoly pricing. Under this assumption the removal of trade tariffs 
50 ibid 
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between the U.S. and Brazil should increase overall market concentration and potential for 
consolidation in both sides of the newly conjoined U.S./Brazilian ethanol market5l . 
Since removing trade tariffs to eliminate the deadweight loss associated with them creates the 
potential for another social deadweight loss through price fixing, logically, trade barrier removal 
should only occur if it decreases net social loss through the process or if the deadweight loss due 
to trade barriers is larger than the probable deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing. Because 
the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing targets consumers based on their willingness to pay it is 
important to compare the price effects of the existence of trade tariffs to the potential effects of 
monopoly pricing. Although it is impossible to say for certain what would occur, a likely result 
can be displayed with production data provided by the RFA and estimated social costs of trade 
barrier existence. 
Assuming that the estimate given in 2007 by The Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial 
Organization is accurate, the total cost of tariffs between the u.S. and Brazil up to 2006 has been 
$80.61 million, the total losses for the United States being $37.96 million. During this time, 
according to statistics from the Renewable Fuels Association, the United States has produced 
approximately 38.07 billion gallons of ethanol. To estimate the cost to U.S. consumers of ethanol 
trade barriers the total net loss due to existence of trade barriers is divided·by the total gallons 
produced during that same time period giving a per gallon cost of barriers to U.S. Brazilian 
ethanol trade of roughly .10 cents52 . When referencing this to forgone consumption it must be 
noted that the lowest available unit for price differentiation is .25 cents in ethanol markets 
allowing one to compare these two numbers only through the logic that a .10 cents per gallon 
51 Moreira, Jose R. and Goldember, Jose. "The Alcohol Program," Energy Policy (1999) 229-245
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Industrial Organizalion 5 (2007): 227-42.
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loss is a relatively minuscule per gallon cost in relation to how producers and consumers 
currently value ethanol through commodity prices. 
VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Through the theory and analysis provided in this study it can be seen that market 
concentration in both farmer and non-farmer owned sectors of the production industry and the 
resulting risk of monopoly pricing will likely rise with removal of tariffs that currently block the 
bilateral trade of ethanol between the United States and Brazil. In order to merit removal of these 
tariffs the dead weight loss due to the existence of the trade tariffs must exceed the probable 
deadweight loss associated with oligopoly power and price fixing. With a per gallon gain of only 
about .10 cents, from removal of trade tariffs and considering that the consumer is not even 
allowed to differentiate based on a price changes smaller than .25 cents due to the practices of 
the commodity trading industry, this study concludes that the benefits of tariff removal could 
plausibly be negated if any significant costs to market concentration were accrued through 
monopoly pricing. Simply stated, to the consumer the cost of trade barriers is so small it is 
essentially UlUloticed at the per gallon level amounting to only one tenth of a cent. Although 
there is no definitive answer based on available data as to weather or not the removal of tariffs on 
ethanol trade between the U.S. and Brazil would result in a net gain or loss, the potential losses 
due to market concentration can be significant and even the cost of increased regulation 
potentially high, given the industry's history. For these reasons this study finds that the potential 
for monopoly/oligopoly pricing through increased market concentration is a significant factor to 
consider when discussing the removal of tariffs to trade between the United States and Brazil and 
should be further researched before action is taken. 
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Politicians and economists advocating trade barrier removal need to explain more 
thoroughly the benefits of increased ethanol trade or explain what factors are likely to change 
making these barriers to trade more costly. This dynamic market is growing and changing at such 
rates that, there are many factors which are important to the industrial organization and appraisal 
of industry costs and benefits that could not be incorporated into this study. These factors include 
but are not limited to such benefits as job creation, increased rural development and costs such as 
environmental degradation and increases in food costs through a raise in commodity prices. It is 
also essential to obtain more infonnation about the industrial organization of the Brazilian 
ethanol production industry and analyze more specifically the potential effects of trade barrier 
removal on its current structure rather than assume it to consolidate based on the evaluation of 
the U.S. production system. 
This study may have concluded that current practices regarding bilateral trade between 
the U.S. and Brazil are likely are potentially more efficient than certain proposed changes 
however, this does not mean that the industry will not continue to evolve. It is also not the 
purpose of this paper to suggest that trade barrier removal is the only factor to cause market 
consolidation. It may well be that market consolidation will occur despite a relatively closed 
trade structure. Based on production capacity currently under construction or expansion, the U.S. 
ethanol industry will likely double in size within the next three years53 . Global ethanol projects 
around the world are also quickly growing to meet demand. Unless demand continues to grow, 
supply will eventually catch up causing the currently high profits seen by ethanol producers to 
fall, a change which could also cause industry consolidation to occur. There are many 
possibilities for the industrial organization ofU.S. ethanol and many uncertainties in its future. 
53 Renewable Fuels Association, "Industry Statistics" The Renewable Fuels Association, 
http://www.ethanolrfa.orglindustry/statistics/. 
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For this reason ethanol and related industries need increased evaluation to better understand the 
appropriate way to handle developing ethanol markets. 
One important comparison for the bilateral trade of ethanol between the U.s. and Brazil 
is the production of sweeteners. Similar to the current market for ethanol, U.s. artificial 
sweeteners are produced from com where Brazilian sweeteners are produced form sugar. These 
two industries producing relatively homogenous products are kept separate through significant 
trade barriers. Interestingly enough, even with domestic protection in both markets the U.s. 
market for artiticial sweeteners produced from com is highly concentrated, composed of 5 major 
firms controlling 85% of the market54 . Further study on the similarities and ditferences in the 
markets for ethanol and sweeteners would be very beneficial to understanding the proper 
industrial organization for the still emerging ethanol production industry. 
The benefit and the curse of current studies conducted on ethanol is that, as the industry 
is evolving and emerging, the studies can be up to date and "cutting edge". Yet, by the same 
reasoning they can also quickly become obsolete as new information surfaces. This study has 
concluded that, for the time being, the proposed removal of trade tariffs between the United 
States and Brazil with regard to market concentration and industrial organization would have 
potentially high costs and relatively insignificant benefits. However, continued study is needed in 
this area of investigation because, although the markets for automotive fuels like ethanol are 
constantly changing, the one thing that is not changing is the increasing need for efficient and 
effective markets for gasoline substitutes. 
54 Science Direct, "Estimating market power in the presence of capacity corn sweetner" Science Direct College 
Edition. http://www.sciencedirect.comlscience?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V8P-4HCOPND­
1&_user=503321 &Jdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000024866&_version= 1&_urlVersi 
on=O& userid=503321 &md5=b738bec37cd9aab5c3d87474c73 fbefa 
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